The location between the Anglo-Saxon and Latin areas of the American hemisphere makes Mexico the nerve center of relations between the two Americas: sometimes in the role of a bridge and in other cases as a watershed. On the one hand, the political and economic ties (for example the common fight against drug trafficking or NAFTA) that bind it to U saand Canada; on the other hand, the history and the strong Latin identity. All this makes Mexico a country in constant transformation both in relations with the outside world and in American internal equilibrium. Also due to this peculiarity, Mexico remains a point of reference for a large part of Latin America. An influence that in the past has repeatedly been able to radiate in a large part of the region, now on the cultural level, now on the political or ideological one, especially until the party-regime of the P ri, the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (Institutional revolutionary party), proved capable of maintaining the nationalist mobilization of the 1911 Revolution and acting as the guardian of national and Latin American sovereignty.

This influence has waned over the last century in conjunction with the accentuation of three factors: the ‘normalization’ of Mexico from a political and social point of view; the effects of globalization; integration with the U sa. In the first case, when the revolutionary tradition faded away, the regime embarked on a process of convergence towards representative democracy. Together with the first, the effects of globalization have accelerated the establishment of new regional integration processes, from which Mexico had often remained on the sidelines in the past. Finally, all of these processes has sanctioned a deep integration and interdependence of Mexico with U know. Washington remains Mexico City’s main political-economic partner. In fact, bilateral relations remain strongly conditioned by the problems of illegal immigration and drug trafficking, but are also marked by the perspective of growing commercial and productive integration. The relationship with the United States inevitably also influences the principal director of foreign policy. Thus, while the number of South American organizations in the region has multiplied and the strength of South American organizations has grown, mostly based on Brazilian and Venezuelan impulses, Mexican geopolitics has become more closely linked to North American and, in particular, to the United States. In this context, both the coup and the Honduran constitutional crisis of 2009, before which Mexico remained almost inert,you know, of which the country had once been the main proponent, today in the process of normalization but on which it has not recently played any form of protagonism, are signs of its growing detachment from the rest of Latin America. For Mexico political system, please check diseaseslearning.com.

However, with the executive of Enrique Peña Nieto, in office since December 2012, Mexico is consolidating the change in its foreign policy strategy, intensifying relations with the countries of Latin America and Asia-Pacific and pursuing diplomatic leadership., favored by an active foreign policy in the main multilateral forums and focused on the promotion of global peace, sustainable development, the protection of human rights and the fight against transnational criminal phenomena (drug trafficking, human trafficking, etc.). This political activism has allowed the Latin country to preside over major international events such as the Cop 16 Conference in Cancun on Climate Change (2010) and the G20 Summit of Heads of State and Government in Los Cabos (2012).

Institutional organization and internal politics

Mexico is a federal republic made up of 31 states and the capital district. The constitution of 1917, which was the culmination of the Revolution, still stands today, albeit partially amended, at the basis of its political organization. The political regime of the P ri that guided the country for the entire twentieth century was founded on his legacy. In 2000, with the election of the opposition candidate Vicente Fox as president of the republic, the long process of democratization in the pluralist and representative sense of Mexican society can be defined as almost concluded. The cornerstone of this system is the presidential figure, invested with enormous powers and with a very high status, but limited by the ban on re-election after the six-year term. In addition to the P ri, depositary of the revolutionary legacy, are joined in the administration of the state by the Partido Acción Nacional (P an, National Action Party), originally a party of Catholic inspiration and close to the industrialists and middle classes of the north of the country, and the Partido de la Revolución Democrática (P rd, Party of the democratic revolution), born in 1989 from a split of the P ri and determined to establish itself, on the left, as the sole heir of the social and nationalist tradition of the Revolution. The electoral success of 2012 allowed the P ri to regain the presidency of the country after the double mandate (2000-12) of the P an of Fox, in fact, and of Felipe Calderón. Nevertheless, the P riit does not have an absolute majority and hence the need for the support vote of the parliamentarians belonging to the P an or the P rd for the various bills in progress. This precarious balance was re-proposed in the vote on the reforms provided for in the non-binding agreement signed in December 2012 by President Peña Nieto and the leaders of P an and P rd (to which the Partido Verde Ecologista de México was added shortly afterwards) and known as ‘Pacto por México’. It is a plan of institutional and structural reforms in a liberal sense summarized in 95 commitments which mainly concern the energy, training, telecommunications, taxation and security sectors. The purpose of this transversal agreement should guarantee institutional governance and complete a democratic transition that is still considered inconclusive. The reform plan met with some parliamentary resistance, but the government achieved the priority objectives (work, taxation, energy, telecommunications, education).

At present, the reform of civil justice and anti-corruption measures, pension reforms, health and agriculture reforms still need to be approved. To try to overcome this impasse and favor a rapid approval of the reforms, the P ri had set itself the goal of achieving an absolute majority in the lower house of the Mexican parliament in the mid-term elections, held on 7 June 2015. The Prifailed in this attempt, confirming itself as the party with a relative majority with 29.2% of the votes but occupying only 204 seats out of 500. However, Peña Nieto was able to continue to count on the support of the Green Party and Nueva Alianza, increasing the his lead over the other major parties: only the P n has exceeded 20%, while the P rd has stood at 10.83%. On 2 September 2015, the president of Mexico, in his annual government report, recognized the difficulties due to the internal situation and a complex global macroeconomic situation, defending and relaunching the reforms launched, with a view to containing public spending.